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“The process of learning, 
of the growth of subjective knowledge, 
is always fundamentally the same.
It is imaginative criticism 
(Karl Popper (1979). p. 148)
Abstract
In this paper I summarize some of the recent literature on learning in games 
and macroeconomic models. I emphasize adaptive learning: the current efforts 
to attain a behavioral foundation for a broad class of adaptive learning rules; 
the alternative definitions of weaker —subjective— equilibrium notions needed 
to characterize the asymptotic outcome of learning processes; the selection of 
equilibria when learning rules satisfy certain properties (e.g., experimentation 
or perturbations); the ability of learning models to explain observed economic 
phenomena which are not properly accounted for by existing equilibrium the­
ories (in particular, financial and macroeconomic data), and, the possibility 
of using learning models as normative models to help the design of economic 
policies and of political and economic institutions.
'Symposia paper of the 7th World Congress of the Econometric Society. To appear in 
David Kreps’ ed. Advances in Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press.I would like 
to thank Buz Brock, Drew Fudenberg, Ed Green, Seppo Honkapohja, Larry Jones, Ehud 
Kalai, Ehud Lehrer, David Levine, Albert Marcet, Ellen McGrattan, John Nachbar, Hamid 
Sabourian, Thomas Sargent, and, specially, Giorgia Giovannetti for their comments on previ­
ous drafts, David Kreps, for his patience and encouragement, and all of those who have sent 























































































































































































Learning and evolutionary theory in economics are two related research fields 
that have experienced exponential growth in the last five years. In a sense, 
this renewed interest on learning theory seems unjustified: the main questions 
being addressed are not new. Nash himself wondered how agents will reach the 
equilibrium he proposed; Muth thought of the rational expectations hypothesis 
as an extreme counterpart to concurrent macroeconomic models with naive ex­
pectations’ formation, to mention two pioneer examples. In this paper I review 
some of the recent contributions on learning theory in games and macroeco­
nomic models. Such a closer look reveals that even if the old questions have not 
yet been fully answered and it remains difficult —if not impossible— to set a 
dividing line between rational and adaptive behavior, a theory of the leamable 
in economics is on its way.
To the question why do we study learning in economics? four main, non 
mutually exclusive, answers have been put forward: i) Bounded rationality, 
ii) Equilibrium justification; in) Equilibrium selection, and iv) Observed non­
equilibrium behavior. Let me briefly comment on each of them.
i) Bounded rationality. It is often argued that “our rationality assumptions are 
too strong, that our models must take into account human weaknesses such as 
limited ability to compute, etc.” In fact, recent developments in decision theory 
(see, Dekel and Gul contribution to this volume) show how the theory of choice, 
and equilibrium, can be founded in weaker rationality, and common knowledge, 
assumptions. Furthermore, as some recent work shows (see Section 3), it is 
also possible to develop a theory based on “behavioral axioms” as a foundation 
for adaptive learning models. Nevertheless, such a choice theoretical model of 
learning would be of very limited interest if it only contributed in making our 
assumptions more realistic. As it has been recognized by many, “realism” can 
not be the object of economic modeling.
ii) Equilibrium justification. This was Nash’s concern. Can we attain equilibria, 
not as a result of a fixed point argument (i.e., with the help of Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand”), but as the asymptotic outcome of a decentralized learning 
process? This remains a focal question and, as we will see in Sections 4 and 
5, substantial progress has been done in the last few years. Answers to this 
question link with applied econometric work: an observed social outcome must 
be leamable by agents. That is, positive answers to the above question can help 



























































































plays a secondary or transitory role: once we have shown that we can justify 
certain equilibrium outcome as the outcome of a learning process, we might as 
well leave learning aside and concentrate on equilibrium theory. In other words, 
for learning theory in economics to stand on its own we must look into other 
explanations.
in) Equilibrium selection. If not all equilibrium outcomes are equally justified, by 
learning, then learning theory can provide a much needed selection criteria. Due 
to multiplicity —often, indeterminacy— of equilibria many of our theories have 
little predictable power. In contrast, experimental evidence shows that in many 
environments some equilibria are more likely to emerge than others, suggesting 
that our theories need more structure to capture these features. For example, 
in games, not all Nash equilibria are equally played. A simple benchmark, that 
anyone can try, is the Battle of the sexes game: the mixed Nash equilibrium 
typically does not emerge. Similarly, competitive rational expectations mod­
els (REE) with incomplete market structure have, in general, a continuum of 
equilibria and experimental evidence shows that not all are equally likely to be 
observed. In fact, the outcomes observed in these different experiments seem 
to be better characterized by the stability properties of learning algorithms.1
The natural step is to replace Nash equilibrium and Rational Expecta­
tions Equilibrium for some suitable refinement. But. as we will see in Sections 
4 and 5, two problems arise. First, if some stability criteria are imposed to 
select among equilibria, then these criteria are not independent of the class of 
learning algorithms under consideration. Second, some games try to model rel­
atively sophisticated agents (e.g., CEO’s managerial decisions, etc.) and some 
proposed refinement concepts are based on high levels of deduction by the play­
ers involved. Whether such levels of sophistication are achieved is, again, an 
empirical question, but learning models should allow for these forms of behavior 
when agents gain enough experience; that is, the “bound” on rationality should 
be displaced away as agents learn through experience.
Learning theory can help to systematically explore and explain evidence 
on equilibrium selection by providing more structure to the map that defines 
how agents form and coordinate their expectations, and actions, based on their 
experience, and capabilities. In particular, alternative consistency and behav­
ioral conditions on learning rules should “make falsifiable” the set of observed 
paths and, in turn, the set of leamable equilibria.
1For an overview of experimental evidence see Kagel and Roth (1995). For games, see 





























































































iv) Observed non-equilibrium behavior. While existing equilibrium theories must 
be ‘'refined” to account for some economic facts, they should also be “extended” 
to account for others. While equilibrium conditions must be stringent to pre­
clude certain unobserved multiplicities, at the same time, may have to be weak­
ened to account for observed persistent patterns that seem to show the com­
plexity of attaining certain equilibrium outcomes. The evidence comes from 
different sources. The experimental lab provides a useful tool to isolate these 
phenomena. There are, at least, three types of experimental facts that should 
be considered and a learning theory may help to explain. First, the “sensitivity 
to marginal payoffs,” that is, typically agents actions are affected by the rela­
tive performance of their actions, something not taken into account by a simple 
-marginalist- maximization point of view, which only considers that the best 
action is taken. Second, the “experience or expectations across environments,” 
seems to affect agents’ behavior. In a theoretical model, agents’ behavior (e.g.. 
in which information, and how, should they condition their decisions?) is usu­
ally predetermined. Nevertheless, experience —and/or expectations about— 
other environments may result in well defined “non equilibrium” patterns by 
agents that try to act rationally across different environments. Third, some 
equilibria seem to be “stable” in the large but “locally unstable”. For example, 
equilibrium selection may occur for low frequency data, while high frequency 
data may show persistent volatility. As a result, observed patterns around the 
equilibrium are more complicated than standard theory prescribes; or may be 
misinterpreted by unproperly randomizing the model.
Macroeconomic and, in particular, financial data also provide evidence 
which is difficult to reconcile with existing dynamic rational expectations equi­
librium models, but may be explained by taking the learning process into ac­
count. For example asset market data shows that there is persitency of returns’ 
volatility and of trading volume (and cross-correlation between absolute returns 
and trading volume). Another example, from macroeconomics, is the existence 
of inflationary spells which can not be accounted as non-stationary rational 
expectations equilibrium paths (see, Section 5).
This possibility of explaining some non-equilibrium behavior raises an ob­
vious question. Does learning theory account for any possible pattern? That 
is, does it justify “everything goes”?. Unfortunately, there are examples that 
seem to point out in this direction (e.g., convergence to fairly arbitrary “aspi­
ration levels” or to indeterminate REE, etc.). However, a closer look at these 
examples shows that agents must coordinate in fairly arbitrary learning rules to 




























































































a decentralized process in which agents’ learning rules can be arbitrarily chosen 
from a large class (satisfying basic behavioral and/or consistency conditions), 
then it does not justify everything goes. As we will see in Section 4 and 5. on 
the one hand, notions of equilibrium, which are weaker than Nash, or REE, 
may be defined by only requiring, for example, that agents’ subjective beliefs 
are self-confirmed in equilibrium. With this notion, non-Nash (or REE) equi­
librium patterns are possible, but not all patterns are possible. In particular, in 
“simple” environments only Nash (or REE) are equilibria. On the other hand, 
for large classes of adaptive learning rules it is possible to dicriminate among 
Nash, or REE, equilibria.
The last two answers, which I would rank as more relevant, can be summa­
rized by saying that the development of a theory of the leamable in economics 
can provide our equilibrium theories with more predictable power, by helping 
to reject some equilibria and by helping to account for other non-equilibrium 
patterns. But then, learning theory plays can also play other roles in economics:
v) The study of complex economic environments. If a class of learning models 
provides consistent results in well understood environments, then such a class 
can be used as a tool to explore more complicated environments that we do not 
know how to characterize ex ante. For example, if the learning model converges, 
then it is usually possible to characterize ex post the resulting outcome: e.g., see 
whether it is a particular type of equilibrium. Some models with Artificially In­
telligent Agents (AIA) have been successfully applied in this way. In fact, in the 
last few years a growing number of computational (and estimation) algorithms 
based on learning and evolutionary principles have been developed. These algo­
rithms have been used both as “theorist tool” to study, for example, nonlinear 
stochastic rational expectations models or as an “applied economist, or finan­
cial analyst, tool” for estimation and prediction. The development of learning 
theory can help to characterize the “learnable solutions” that such computa­
tional and estimation procedures may attain (see, for example, Sargent 1993 
and White 1992).
vi) As a normative theory. This is an area of research which has been little ex­
plored, but learning can contribute to our normative theories in different ways 
(see Section 5 for some examples). First, a disturbing feature of models with 
multiplicity of equilibria is that the welfare implications of an economic policy 
usually are different across equilibria. If, for a large class of learning algorithms 
and initial conditions, the process converges to a particular equilibrium, then 




























































































or institutions, can be designed taking into account the fact that agents must 
learn from their experience; say, about the effects of different incentives or tax 
schemes. For example, many economic policies suffer from some form of indeter­
minacy since the effect of their announcement depends on agents' expectations. 
While there is an extend literature on “credibility problems" as incentive prob­
lems, reputation (inference from policy announcements given past experience) 
is also a learning problem and a better understanding of it can help policy de­
sign. Similarly, market and organizational forms can be designed taking into 
account how institutional arrangements affect the stability properties of equilib­
ria and, therefore, affect welfare when the process of convergence to equilibrium 
is also taken into account. Third, the designer, or planner, may have to take 
into account that he, or the designed organization, has also to learn. In other 
words,the problem may not of designing a contract or organization that it is 
efficient from a given period zero and is simply executed as uncertainties unfold, 
but the problem may be to design a contract that will adapt well to “unforeseen 
contingencies;” in a similar fashion that living organisms can perform well, but 
not because they are executing God’s plan at period zero.
As it can be seen, the scope of a theory of the leamable in economics goes 
well beyond the standard —and Nash’s original question— of whether we can 
justify an equilibrium concept as being the result of a learning process. My aim 
in the remaining of the paper is to summarize some of the recent results that, 
I think, are helping in building up such a theory. Given the rapid growth of 
this literature, I only report on some of the recent contributions on individual 
learning (Section 3), learning in games (Section 4) and learning in dynamic 
macroeconomic models (Section 5).2 In the next Section, I introduce some 
notation and describe a basic framework.
2 B asic framework
A large class of economic, and game theoretical, models can be casted in a 
relatively simple general framework. There is a set of agents I, time is dis­
crete (0 ,1 ,...). At each period of time there are actions sets for agents, Ai, a 
public outcome set X , and a set of states of nature S. In period t, agent i's 
one-period ex-post payoff, axe represented by Mj(aiit, z (+i), and ex-ante present 
value payoffs by (1 — 6)E^2^L0 6nEu(aiit+n, xt+l+n), where 6 € [0,1) (notice
2See Kandori’s contribution to this volume for a review of the, closely related, evolutionary 




























































































that 6 =  0 corresponds to myopic behavior and the lim$_, is given by the long 
run average expected payoff: lim7-_00 YZZo 1 Eu(at+n, x t+i+n)). The pub­
lic outconae evolves according to: xt = <fr{g(at, . . . ,  at- m), xt- i ,__ x,_m, st),
where g aggregates the actions of all the agents, and s, € S  is an exogenous 
shock.3
Within this framework we can consider several environments, i) Single 
agent without intertemporal feedback I  =  {?’} and x t = st. This is the stan­
dard case of individual decision theory with uncertainty, ii) Single agent with in­
tertemporal feedback. I  - {i} andx( =  i , ___x t- \ , ___________ x t- m. st)
Individual investment problems take this form and, as we will see in Section 3, 
most learning difficulties, usually associated with multiagent problems, already 
appear in these environments. Hi) Multiagent without intertemporal feedback.
I  = {1 ,... ,n}, and x t =,<f>(g(at- i), st). The standard example is a multistage 
game?: x t = (notice that for every player a ‘‘public outcome” is de­
fined). iv) Competitive with intertemporal feedback. I  =  [0,1] (i.e., a continuum 
of agents) and x t =  4>{g(at, at-i), x t-\, sf). For example, in a determinis­
tic temporary equilibrium model, such as the standard overlapping generations 
model, Xt =  g(at, at-1).
In most of the above environments, the actions of agent i do not affect 
the public outcome. Then, from the perspective of agent i, given the actions of 
other agents the public outcome can be thought of as “the state of the
outside world.” The realizations of the stochastic process {xt}“ 0 are governed 
by a probability measure v on (X>o, T x ); where X t = nS=o X and T t is the 
cr-field generated by (x0, . . . ,  x t), the corresponding empirical distribution -as 
it is perceived by agent i -  is denoted by mt (with subindex only when needed); 
i.e., mt is a probability measure on (X t, Tf). Even when agent Vs actions affect 
the public outcome, as long as he does not take account of this dependence, he 
may still consider the public outcome as “the exogenous outside world.”
Some further notation is needed to denote agent’s decisions. At any 
point in time -say, t -  the agent must take a (mixed) action, at € A(A), 
based on all his past information, represented by ht € Ht (ht may include 
(Xo, . . .  ,x t), (sq, . . . ,  st-i)(ao, ■ ■ ■, a(-i), as well as all the information that the 
agent has about (A, X, S, u, and u)). A behavioral rule (or strategy), a maps 
histories into (mixed) actions (i.e., a : /X  —> A(A), ot is hit measurable).
3I use the following standard notation: if at is denotes the actions of all the agents in period 
t, then at = where t denotes the actions of “all agents but i”. Furthermore,
a* =  (ao,. •. ,a t): similarly for other variables. Also, when there is no confusion, u(a, m) 




























































































In the standard framework, A, X, S, u, and v are assumed to be known, 
and the Savage or Anscombe and Auinann (1963) axioms prescribe that the 
agent will choose the path of actions that maximizes expected utility. In this 
case, it is irrelevant for the solution of the problem whether the agent is facing 
a “once and for all” problem or has accumulated “experience.” The problem, 
even in its infinite-horizon formulation is essentially a static problem that has a 
resolution in period zero by choosing the optimal behavioral rule. In the general 
equilibrium framework, this corresponds to solving for Arrow-Debreu contingent 
plans in period zero. As it is well known, even in this context, the character­
ization, and computation, of optimal behavioral rules is greatly simplified if 
they have a recursive structure. That is, whether there is an “optimal policy" 
R, such that optimal o' satisfy =  R(xt. 0t). where 8t is some vector
statistic from ht which follows a pre-specified law of motion 9t — 9t-i)
(with initial conditions).
In a learning process, experience is essential and so it is some form of 
recursivity that explicitly defines how experience is accumulated. As we will 
see, when cr*(/i() =  R(xt, 9t), R  may be a fairly complicated object, which 
may include a selection procedure among simpler recursive rules, an internal 
accounting system, etc. In many economic problems, however, a relatively 
simple behavioral rule R  is assumed. For example, o*(ht) =  BR{x\+]) .  where 
B R (x j+1) is -a  selection from- agent’s best reply to his expectations about the 
public outcome xf+1, and xf+1 =  f ( x t, 6t). where /  is a forecasting rule. For 
example, 6t = (x£, at), f ( x t, x \ , at) = x\ + at(xt -  xet ) and a, = 
that is, if Qo =  1 then i ' +1 is the empirical mean. Notice that, in this case, 
R  =  BR ■ f  and il>(xt, 8t) = (f((x t,x*, a t), at +  1). More generally, one can 
consider R  as an element of a class of learning rules 1Z. In this case, the agent 
may “choose how to learn,” that is, select which learning rule R  6 1Z fits better 
his learning needs. For example, in the last formulation, the class of learning 
rules, 1Z, may be defined by two parameters (a, Qo) characterizing the step size 
sequence: a t =  (e.g., if a =  (1 — do) then at — c*o for all f), or by
having a finite memory with some parametric form.
It is standard to separate decision models, according to the number of 
agents, that is whether it is an individual choice model, a finite agent, or com­
petitive equilibrium model. I will follow this classical separation in the following 
sections. However, from the point of view of learning theory, more than the 
number of agents, what matters is how agents actions feedback into, or are cor­
related with, the public outcome. In a sense, leamable equilibria are solutions 




























































































For an equilibrium to be the asymptotic outcome of a learning process (i.e.. 
a leamable equilibrium) it is required that for even- individual agent his ex­
pectations about the public outcome are self-confirmed, and that his resulting 
actions do not disturb such expectations. Different forms of feedback -together 
with the complexity of the “outside world" and of the decision process- make 
such convergence more or less difficult to achieve. This will be a recurrent theme 
through the following sections.
3 Learning to  choose
Ad-hoc learning economic models have been around for long time without build­
ing up to a theory of adaptive learning. In contrast. Bayesian statistical methods 
have given foundation to a well developed theory of Bayesian learning. While 
the basic elements of the theory date back to the development of the corre­
sponding statistical theory (see, for example, de Groot 1970), the theory was 
“put in use” in the seventies and eighties as a learning foundation of rational 
expectations equilibria by Jordan and Blume and Easley, among others, and in 
the early nineties as a learning foundation of Nash and Correlated equilibria by 
Jordan (1991), Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b, and 1995) and Nvarko (1994). 
among others.
3.1 Rational learning?
Bayesian learning has been labeled “rational learning” since within the Bayesian 
framework, the Bayesian learner satisfies the standard rationality axioms. In 
particular, along the learning process, the agent follows “optimal statistical 
procedures” and his views of the world “can not be contradicted,” if anything, 
they become “more accurate.” However, as it is well known, the quotation 
marks can not be dismissed. In relatively complex environments the optimal 
procedures are optimal only in reference to the agent’s simplified view of the 
environment, not in relation to the actual environment; the agent’s simplified 
view maybe highly counterfactual, although the agent may not perceive this 
and, as a result, the agent’s predictions may be far from converging to the right 
predictions. It is for these reasons that Bayesian learning will only be a first 
short stop in our search for a theory of the learnable in economics (see Blume 




























































































A Bayesian learner summarizes his uncertainty about the aspects of the 
economy that axe unknown to him with an appropriate prior distribution. That 
is, the agent knows what he does not know. For example, if payoffs are unknown 
the prior must also be defined over possible payoff functions. To make the prob­
lem manageable, most Bayesian learning model reduce learning to a forecasting 
problem. The Bayesian learner starts with a prior p on (X ^ . T ^ ).  and follows 
a process of Bayesian updating p(xt+i|rc*). The question is whether this up­
dated beliefs converges to the real distribution v(xt+ I f  such convergence 
is achieved then forecasted beliefs and the objective distribution are said to 
strongly merge. The basic result in which this literature builds is a theorem by 
Blackwell and Dubins (1963) which says that if v is absolutely continuous with 
respect to p  (denoted v «  p), then the forecasts of the corresponding condi­
tional distributions strongly merge (i/ < <  p if for any subset D of A',*,, v(D) > 0 
implies p(D) > 0). That is, the forecaster can not place ex-ante zero probabil­
ity to paths that have positive probability in the environment (see Kalai and 
Lehrer 1993a and Nyarko 1994).
Blackwell and Dubins’ theorem exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses 
of Bayesian learning theory. The theorem, as many analytic learning results, 
is based on the martingale convergence theorem (and the Radon-Nikodyn the­
orem) and it provides a very strong tool for convergence theorems. However, 
it also also shows how the learner must “show his cards” ex-ante by commit­
ting himself to a prior p and to follow the Bayesian rules of the game. To see 
this, consider a simple environment where X  = {0,1}. Let v define a sequence 
of Bernoulli trials (i.e., Prob{x( =  1} =  p 6 (0,1) for all t > 1) and let the 
Bayesian’s prior distribution on (0,1), p(j>o), be a Beta distribution with param­
eters (90, 1 — qo)- Then the Bayesian process of updating posteriors p(pt+i\xt) 
is -almost- that of a frequentalist in the sense that, p{+1, = f/( and, for t > 0, 
qt =  9(_ 1 +  ^-j-(x( — qt-i)  and pt —* V  That is, his forecasts are accurate in 
the limit.4
Two small variations of the above endowment are enough to question the 
“rationality” of the Bayesian learner. First, suppose that X  =  {0,1,2}, but 
that the agent thinks that X  = {0,1} and behaves as before. The unexpected 
event xt =  2 will be ignored by the dogmatic Bayesian while it will be easily 
accounted for by the frequentalist. Second, consider that X  =  {0,1}, but
4Here <5P denotes the (Dirac) distribution with point-mass at p. Notice that a frequentalist 
will have point-expectations pf+l = Pt + }(xt —p‘) for t > 0. That is, the mean forecasts of a 
Bayesian with an appropriate Beta prior distribution are those of a frequentalist with a prior 




























































































that v defines a deterministic cycling sequence (0.1.0.1.......0.1___). Both.
the Bayesian and the frequentalists described above will converge to the belief 
pe =  1/2, disregarding the ‘'obvious” cycling pattern.
These last examples show the importance of some form of absolute conti­
nuity condition on the prior beliefs with respect to the ‘'true” environment in 
order to achieve accurate forecasts (strong merging). But. as Nachbar (1995) 
has recently shown, even when such absolute continuity conditions are satisfied, 
there is another limitation on the “rational learning” approach that must be 
taken into account. An idea underlying “rational learning” is that if an agent 
knows how to best reply to his forecast, then strong merging of beliefs results 
in optimal outcomes against accurate predictions. This is correct if one con­
siders stationary environments in which the actions of the individual agent do 
not affect the distribution of the public outcome, but when such distribution is 
affected by the agent’s actions then this property of “rational learning” may be 
too much to ask for.
To better understand this difficulty consider the following example. Let 
X  =  {0,1}, A = {a1, a2}, u(a \ 1) =  u(a2,0) =  0, u(a ',0) =  u(a2. 1) = 1. 
Suppose that a bayesian learner starts with a prior p satisfying the absolute 
continuity condition with respect to a class of envirnonments v G Af. His 
prior and the process of bayesian updating will result in a best reply behavioral 
strategy, a, for any environment v G Af. Suppose that such strategy' is a pure 
strategy, that is V/i<, at(ht) G A. Now consider a class of “miscoordination 
environments” defined by Prob{x( =  0|x1-1} > 1/2 if <7t(xi_1) =  a2 and 
Prob{x( =  l|x t_1} > 1/2 if cr((x(_1) =  a1. If these environments are in Af 
then the agent will, eventually learn to forecast, but then a will no longer be 
his optimal strategy. Associated with the new best reply strategy there are 
other “miscoordination environments,” etc. The problem is that, in general, 
one can not “close” this process. That is, in general, one can not have an 
optimal strategy for all environments in A/ and, at the same time, remain 
within this class Af when the the feedback from the optimal strategy is taken 
into account. For example, if, moving ahead, we consider the public outcome as 
the resulting action of a second player in a Battle the Sexes game, then the lack 
of “closedness” means that if Af is “rich enough” it can not simultaneously be 
the set of plausible strategies of the opponent and the set to which best reply 
strategies belong.
Nachbar’s warning is in the spirit of the impossibility theorems that, since 
Goedel’s theorem, have been common in the “logicians approach” to learning 




























































































from being “impossibility of learning” results are warnings against us making 
excessive “rationality and completeness” demands.5 With this lesson of Humil­
ity, a first direction to pursue is to be less demanding about what is meant by 
a learnable outcome.
3.2 R ational, calibrated beliefs and other consistency  
conditions
Strong merging of beliefs requires that even tail events are forecasted correct ly. 
This is a very strong consistency condition. A weaker, and reasonable, condition 
is to require only accurate forecasts over arbitrarily long but finite future hori­
zons. If this property is satisfied then it is said that forecasts weakly merge with 
the true environment (see, Lehrer and Smordinsky 1993). Therefore, in non- 
stationary environments, tail events may prevent forecasts from being accurate 
and, in multiple agent environments, may prevent agents from asymptotically 
agreeing.
Similar ideas have been formalized by Kurz (1994a, 1994b) as a basis 
for his concept of rational belief equilibria. A rational belief is one that it is 
“consistent” with the observed long-run empirical distribution. That is, even 
if v does not define a stationary process, as long as the long-run empirical 
distribution is well defined -say, m -  then the environment is considered to be 
stable. Rational beliefs, p, axe those which are “compatible with the data,” 
in the sense of generating the same empirical distribution m, which must also 
be absolutely continuous with respect to the beliefs (i.e.. rn << fi; see, Kurz 
(1994a) for details). Since many measures on (.X0O,.7rO0) are compatible with 
the same empirical distribution, heterogeneity of beliefs (at the tail!) is allowed. 
A rational believer can be thought as a bayesian learner that is born with 
experience, and forced to use the empirical distribution as a prior, and for 
which forecast weakly merge with the environment.
5In the context of evolutionary repeated games, Anderlini and Sobourian (1995) provide 
a global convergence result for computable environments which contrasts with Nachbar’s 
negative results. We can translate an informal version of their results to our context. Now 
instead of having a single behavioral rule, the agent will be considering a large number of 
them and, as in an evolutionary process, give more weight to those rules that are performing 
better. Anderlini and Sabourian show that asymptotically an optimal rule will be selected, 
which, in the context of games, means there is global convergence to a Nash equilibrium. 
Anderlini and Sabourian’ result does not contradict Nachbar’s since the selected rule will 





























































































A similar -and weaker- concept is that of a ‘'well calibrated forecaster" 
(see, Dawid (1982)). A well calibrated forecaster is one whose forecasts -  
asymptotically- conform with the empirical distribution. For example, the 
stock price should go up 2/3 of the periods that it is forecasted that it will 
go up with probability 2/3. Foster and Vohra (1995a and 1995b) have recently 
further developed this idea and applied to study convergence of calibrated learn­
ing schemes to correlated equilibria (see Section 4).
It should be clear that “calibrated forecasts” may be far from accurate. 
Consider again the cyclic environment X  = {0,1} with v generating (0,1.0.1. 
. . . ,  0 ,1 ,...) . A forecast of x t = 1 with probability one half will be well cali­
brated while an accurate forecast for v l will make a prediction of x t conditioned 
on x t- i ; or conditioned on whether t is odd or even.
As in statistical inference, alternative consistency conditions provide dif­
ferent convergence tests. In line with statistical tests, Fudenberg and Levine 
(1995a) propose a weak asymptotic consistency test to assess the “fitness" of a 
behavioral rule. A behavioral rule a is said to be (e — 6) consistent if there exist 
a T  such that for any i.i.d. environment i/, and for t > T  with confidence & the 
realized long-run average payoff (up to t) is, within an error t. at least as good 
as the optimal -one period- mixed strategy against the empirical distribution 
m t.6
In other words, Fudenberg and Levine take the empirical distribution -  
not the “true environment”-  as reference and require that the behavioral rule 
performs almost as well as optimal play against the empirical distribution. Im­
mediately comes to mind a simple generalization of the frequentalist forecaster. 
The well known fictitious play rule: compute the empirical distribution of the 
opponents’ play and best reply against such empirical distribution. The prob­
lem is that while the fictitious player in i.i.d environments may attain accurate 
forecasts and almost maximal payoffs, one can also construct “miscoordination” 
(non i.i.d.) environments to trick a fictitious player. However, Fudenberg and 
Levine (1995) show that an exponential version of fictitious play is (e — in­
consistent for any environment; they call such property universal consistency.
To base consistency tests on the empirical distribution, instead than on 
the true distribution, is a necessary step for a theory of the leamable. However, 
two difficulties must be considered. First, the fact that the agent perceives the
®That is, o{ht \ \  J2n=0 u(a„, xn) +  e > maxa u(a, m t)} > (1 — 6). Valiant’s Probably Ap­
proximately Correct (PAC) learning theory relates the (e — <5) rind T  consistency requirements 
with the complexity of the class of concepts to be learned (sample complexity) and with the 




























































































marginal empirical distribution and in environments with feedback the actual 
-correlated- distribution may be difficult to recover from such a partial picture. 
Second, the problem, already mentioned, of pattern recognition of the empirical 
distribution, that is, of finding the right conditioning of the data. The following 
example illustrates these difficulties.
E xam ple 1 There are three actions and three possible states. Payoffs are given by
X 1 X 2 X 3
a1 0 2 1
a2 l 0 2
a3 2 1 0
I consider two environments, in the first environment, private actions and public outcomes 
are correlated in the following form: Prob{xt =  x'lot = a1} =  Prob{xt = x2|a( = a2} = 
Prob{i( =  x3|ot =  a3} =  0, and Prob{xt =  x2|at =  a 1} =  Prob{x( =  x3|a( =  a 1} = 
Prob{x< =  x 'la! =  a2} =  Probfit - x3|a, =  a2} =  Prob{xt =  x^at =  a3} =  Prob{x( = 
x2|ai =  a3} = 1/2. Notice that if the agent plays the three actions with (almost) equal 
probability, the empirical distribution, m, can converge to the uniform distribution and well 
calibrated (universally consistent) beliefs will be self confirmed, and the agent will receive 
an average payoff close to 1. Nevertheless, if the agent conditions on his own actions, or if 
simply sticks to one action, he can receive a payoff of almost 1.5 and with respect to such 
(conditioned) empirical distribution be a well calibrated forecaster.
In the second environment (a one agent version of Shapley’s (1964) example), there 
is the following intertemporal feedback: Prob{x( =  x1 |at_i =  a2} =  Prob{x( =  x2|at_i =  
a3} =  Prob{l. =  x3|at_i =  a1} =  1. If the agent behaves as a well calibrated (uncondi­
tional) forecaster, the history of play will cycle and the perceived distribution can approximate 
the uniform distribution. Again, almost equal weight to all three actions can be a consistent 
behavior. But then, the agent does not take into account two important elements. First, 
along any (countable) history, the agent infinitely often assigns positive probability to zero 
probability events (see Jordan 1993 for a similar remark). Second, at the beginning of period 
t, there is a much better sufficient statistic to predict the future outcome, x(: the last action 
of the agent a,_ That is, with the same information -and different conditioning- the agent 
can receive an average payoff of almost 2.
In a sense, Fudenberg and Levine’ universal consistency condition tests a 
behavioral rule against an econometrician who knows how to adopt the optimal 
action with respect to the empirical distribution. That is, there still is an 
external element of reference. However, it may be that either the agent is 
constrained to a set of behavioral rules, 7Z, or that the problem is complex 
enough that the econometrician is not in a better position than the learning 
agent. In these contexts, one may have to consider an internal consistency 




























































































the approach taken by Evans and Ramey (1994). Brock and Hommes (1995) 
and by Nicolini and Marcet (1995) (see Section 5). Brock and Hommes consider 
learning agents as consumers of forecasting services who axe willing to tradeoff 
accuracy for lower forecasting fees. Nicolini and Marcet consider agents that 
choose, among a class of adaptive learning rules, the one that better tracks the 
possible nonstationarities of their economic environment. Consistency is then 
defined in relative terms within such a class. In these models that agents ‘‘choose 
how to learn” consistency is not defined only asymptotically, since agents keep 
testing different rules and which one is the best rule may keep changing in a 
nonstationary environment.
We have been moving away from the set frame of Bayesian learning. In 
considering classes of rules and, particularly, in studying their "consistency." 
opens two obvious questions (see Kreps 1990): Can we characterize a broad 
class of adaptive learning algorithms based on few behavioral assumptions'.'’ 
Does such behavior result in “standard” optimal, or equilibrium, choices in 
relatively simple environments?
3.3 Learnable choice
In the context of games, Milgrom and Roberts (1991) have provided a first 
characterization of a learning class based on a weak monotonicity condition: 
“an adaptive rule must only play strategies that, in relation to the observed 
finite history, are undominated.” Marimon and McGrattan (1995) consider 
a general class of learning rules based on a stronger monotonicity condition 
(together with experimentation and inertia): an adaptive learning rule must 
move in the direction of the -possibly, unknown- best reply map , that is, must 
follow the evolutionary principle of assigning more weight to actions that have 
been shown to work better in the past.
Recently, Easley and Rustichini (1995) have “rationalized” replicator type 
dynamics. They consider a class of finite memory simple rules -say, a pure 
strategy- and adaptive rules 71 which select -or weight- different simple rules. 
They impose basic “axioms” on the selection procedure 1Z: i) a monotonicity 
condition: increase the weight on rules that have relatively high payoffs; ii) a 
symmetry condition: selection procedures should not be affected by relabeling, 
and m) an independence (of irrelevant alternatives) condition: the effect of a 
payoff on the weight of a simple rule should be independent of other payoffs. 
In the context of single agent problems without intertemporal feedback, they 




























































































selects rules which are objective expected utility maximizers, among the set of 
simple rules; second, any expected utility maximizer rule can be selected by a 
procedure satisfying the axioms, and, third the class of selection procedures, 71. 
satisfying these axioms are, at least asymptotically, strict monotone transforms 
of replicator dynamics.
In particular, the family of exponential fictitious play rules, which, as 
we have seen before, Fudenberg and Levine (1995a) show is (e — 8)-universally 
consistent, is representative of the class of rules satisfying Easley and Rustichini' 
axioms. In other words, the universal consistency condition is satisfied for a class 
of behavioral rules characterized by few “behavioral axioms." Furthermore, a 
representative of such a class can be constructed.
Unfortunately, in more complex environments, these basic axioms may 
not be enough for learning. First, when either the learning problem is not just 
a forecasting problem, and the agent must also learn about his payoffs or the 
set of actions at his disposal, or in non stationary environments, experimen­
tation is an essential feature of the learning process. Second, in environments 
with intertemporal feedback from individual agents, there may be a problem of 
overreactions resulting in agents never learning the final consequences of their 
actions. Inertia, that is to stick to the same action with some probability, is 
a form of building stationarity into the environment on the part of the agent. 
In summary, in addition to a strong monotonicity condition -say, of the repli­
cator dynamics type- experimentation and inertia characterize a general class 
of learning rules and a more general theory of leamable choice must take them 
into account (Marimon and McGrattan 1995; see also Fudenberg and Levine 
1995a and Kaniovski and Young 1995).
3.4 E xplicit behavioral rules
Learnable outcomes must be achieved by explicit behavioral rules. Experimen­
tal economics, applied decision theory, and behavioral sciences may help us 
understand how economic subjects actually learn from their experience, but in 
the same way that we need explicit functional forms representing preferences 
and technologies to test and develop our economic theories and econometricians 
need explicit estimation programs, a theory of the leamable in economics needs 
explicit behavioral rules: recursive rules suitable for computational experimen­
tation. Fictitious play, and its variants, are examples of explicit adaptive rules. 
They are examples of more general classes of rules. First, as a recursive esti­




























































































Second, as recursive meta-rules that choose among simple rules or actions, they 
are examples of artificially intelligent agents. I finish this section with a brief 
discussion of these general classes of explicit behavioral rules (see. Sargent 1993, 
for other economic examples).
A daptive learning as a stochastic approxim ation algorithm
The frequentalist methods of computing the sample mean or the empirical 
distribution, are simple examples of stochastic approximation methods. The 
following example (a variant of fictitious play) illustrates the strength of these 
algorithms (see, Arthur 1993, Easley and Rustichini 1995 and Marimon and 
McGrattan 1995).
Exam ple 2 The agent only knows his set of actions A  =  (a1, . . . ,  a") and only observes his 
realized payoffs, i.e., does not observe { it}’ We assume that {xt } is (strictly) stationary and 
that payoffs are strictly positive and bounded (u > u(a.x) > u > 0). A Bayesian learner 
would have to form a prior over possible payoff matrices, in addition to the prior on g. etc. 
The adaptive agent, instead defines his behavioral strategy by randomly choosing among 
actions according to some measure of relative strength. Let .S'} be the strength attached to 
action ak in period t and S  = )Tfc=i Sk ■ Fix Si € 'R,++(i.e., S k > OVfc) (this is the extent in 
which our adaptive agent has a prior). Then strengths evolve according to the rule
gk _  gk |  u(ak,x t ) if ak is used at t
t+1 1 1 0 otherwise
then actions are randomly selected according to at (a*) = To express this behavioral rule 
in stochastic approximation form, let z \  =  a*(afc), and v(afi ,x t ) be a random variable that 
takes value 0 with probability (1 — zk) and u(ak,x) with probability zkvt(x). Then, we have 
that mixed actions evolve according to
4»  = 4  + ^-Ka*,xt) -  (s,+1 -  st)zk}*̂ t+1
This is an example of a stochastic process of the form
z(+i =  zt + at[h{at, zt)\ (1)
where z is the object to be learned and h(at,z t) is a random variable, which 
depends on the parameter z and, possibly, on the action a taken by the agent. If 
“the gain sequence” (for simplification taken to be deterministic) {7(} satisfies 
a “decay condition” (DHU a t = oo, a f < oo for some p > 1), and zt is a 




























































































equations (1) are given by the solutions of E[h{a,zt)] =  0.7 A specially useful 
result is that the corresponding asymptotic behavior of {z(} are characterized 
by the solutions of the ordinary difference equation
^ ( r )  =  £[A(a,z(r))] (2)
Returning to our Example 2, the corresponding ODE is,
E[u(ak,x )] — E  r-’(t)[u(a-’,x)]
This is a form of the replicator dynamics and the stable stationary point of the ODE 
correspond to assigning all the weight to the actions with highest expected payoff. That is. 
with very little information, and fairly simple behavioral rules, the agent learns to choose 
actions that maximize the objective expected utility of the one-period decision problem. 
Although, this may take a long time! As Arthur (1993) shows comparing his artificial agents 
with the results with human subjects reported by Busch and Mosteller (1955), the rates of 
convergence, and convergence itself, is very sensitive to the degree of disparity of payoffs.
As we have seen, a frequentalist who computes the empirical distribution 
of a process {xt}, xt € {0,1} can completely miss a well defined cycling pattern. 
This is a general problem in defining learning processes as Stochastic Approx­
imation Algorithms (or any type of algorithm). The underlying environment 
prescribes which algorithm is better suited for learning (in terms of a consis­
tency condition). For example, in the cycling case would be enough to properly 
condition the algorithm (e.g., have a forecast for odd periods and another for 
even periods). Similarly, one may want to adjust the “gain sequence” to the 
environment (see, for example, Benveniste et al. 1990). It is well understood 
that there is a tradeoff between tracking and accuracy, a decrease of the gain 
a  reduces variance of the error (allows for more accuracy), but, at the same 
time, may increase the bias of the forecast since it tends to underestimate the 
possible drift or nonstationarity of the underlying process (may not “track” well 
the process). This, which is a standard problem in statistical inference, shows
7See, Benveniste et al. (1990) and Ljung et al. (1992) for an account of Stochastic 
Approximation Theory. In particular, when the process has a fixed a , then it is a Markovian 
process, and, with enough perturbations (experimentations), the process is ergodic. That is, 
there is an ergodic distribution m{a) characterizing the asymptotic behavior of the process 
{Zt}. We can then take the limit of these distributions m(a) as a  —* 0 at the right rate. 
This is the approach taken by simulated annealing methods which have been widely applied 
in evolutionary models (see Kandori’s contribution to this volume). This shows that, as long 
as adaptation and evolution are governed by similar rules, differences in asymptotic behavior 
can only be attributed to different form in which perturbations and limits of a  interact.




























































































the type of tradeoffs that are common in learning dynamics and that a learning 
theory must account for.
Artificially intelligent agents
Example 2 of an adaptive decision maker selecting rules according to their 
relative strength, can be seen as a very simplified brain of an artificially intel­
ligent agent using Holland’s classifier systems (CS) (see, for example. Holland 
1995). Classifier systems, based on genetic algorithms, were designed as an "all 
purpose adaptive algorithm.” That is, in contrast with experts systems specially 
designed for a task or problem, and in contrast with learning machines, such as 
neural networks (NN), that even if there were not designed for a particular task 
needed external training with an environment before they could appropriately 
perform, CS could -in principle- adapt to alternative tasks and learn from the 
beginning. In fact, some of the CS principles -mainly, selection of rules by 
genetic algorithm operations- have been incorporated in neural network archi­
tecture. Recurrent neural networks (RNN) share many things in common with 
Classifier Systems.
It is not possible to describe here these different classes of recursive algo­
rithms (see, for example, Holland 1995, Sargent 1993, Cho and Sargent 1995 and 
White 1994), but only to point out some features that characterize their “higher 
adaptability:” i) Decisions, as languages, are decomposed into basic components 
(“if . . .  then” statements, neurons, etc.); ii) the “builiding blocks” structure 
means that there is “parallel learning” of different components (schemata in 
CS); in) an internal accounting system allows aggregation and internal trans­
mission of information, which may result in building up “internal models” (e.g., 
some forms of endogenous pattern recognition); iv) even if certain “tuning to 
the environment” is needed, stochastic search can result in “discoveries,” that 
is, “unforeseen contingencies” may be accounted for. These features of artificial 
intelligent agents allows them to learn through relatively complex environments 
generating interesting -non linear- feedback. For this reason, an economy with 
feedback populated by artificial intelligent agents is labeled a Complex Adaptive 
Systems. At the same time, such sophistication makes their analytical study 
more difficult and computational simulations are an integral part of the devel­




























































































4 Learning in gam es
From the perspective of learning theory, game theory provides a set of models 
where feedback effects may be specially perverse, except that they are governed 
by the norms of behavior that characterize individual learning. I discuss some 
of the recent contributions to the theory of learning in games (see also Fuden- 
berg and Levine, 1995b). Broadly speaking, I proceed from weaker behavioral 
assumptions and solutions to stronger ones.
M onotonicity and rationalizable solutions
As we have seen, adaptive behavior can be characterized by a monotonicity 
condition. Milgrom and Roberts (1991) condition of only playing strategies 
which in relation to a finite past history of play are not strictly dominated, is 
a fairly weak monotonicity condition. Nevertheless, as they have shown, it is 
enough to guarantee that, in the long run only rationalizable strategies will be 
played. That is only strategies that survive an iterated process of elimination of 
strictly dominated strategies. This result has an immediate corollary, if agents 
behavior satisfies their monotonicity condition and play converges to a single 
strategy profile, a”, then it must be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
If an agent is not fully aware of his feedback on the environment, or not 
all actions are observable and experimentation is costly enough, then he may 
converge to play an action which does not maximize objective expected utility, 
but maximizes his subjective expected utility. In a sense, Milgrom and Roberts 
result is “too strong” since if their monotonicity condition is expressed in terms 
of subjective beliefs, then only subjective rationalizability may be achieved.
4.1 Subjective equilibrium notions
A process of iterated elimination of strategies which are not a best reply to 
subjective beliefs may converge to a situation where every player i, adopts a 
behavioral strategy <7; that is optimal, given his subjective beliefs p* of other 
agents’ play (of the environment), and his beliefs are not contradicted. That is, 
p, coincides with Ui, where ip is the objective marginal distribution induced on 
player i ’s play paths (i.e., i> =  (<7i x • • • x a,)). In other words, agent i's beliefs 
may not coincide with the objective distribution outside his play paths, as it is 




























































































Subjective equilibrium notions in economics go back to Hayek (1945). Hahn 
(1973) defined a conjectural equilibrium as a situation where agents7 subjective 
beliefs (agents’ models) about the economy were self-fulfilled and agents had no 
incentive to change their policies. This notion has been formalized, in the con­
text of games, by Battigalli (see Battigalli et al 1994). In the context of games, 
more recently, Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1995) 
have proposed the notion of self-confirming equilibrium and -subsequently and 
independently- Kalai and Lehrer (1993b. 1995) the notion of subjective equilib­
rium. In a subjective equilibrium agents may misperceive their feedback on the 
social outcome. For example, in an oligopolistic market, with a large number 
of firms, a competitive equilibrium would correspond to a subjective equilibrium 
where firms do not take into account their individual effect on prices (see also 
Brousseau and Kirman, 1995).
Even if agents observe the actions of their opponents and know how to best 
reply to them, non-objective beliefs can be self-confirmed. For example, in an 
extensive game with limited experimentation, two players can have inconsistent 
beliefs about a third player and never realize this since the information that 
would show such inconsistency is never revealed (see Fudenberg and Kreps 
1995).
Kalai and Lehrer (1993, 1995), Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Fu­
denberg and Kreps (1995 and 1994) provide conditions under which such sub­
jective equilibria are, in fact, Nash equilibria. For instance, in a one stage 
game self-confirming equilibria are Nash equilibria since all information sets 
axe reached. The convergence of bayesian learning in repeated games to Nash 
equilibria has also been established by Nyarko (see Nyarko 1994) and, recently, 
Sandroni (1995) has extended these results to finitely repeated games.
Subjectivism , marginal best replies and correlated equilibria
As seen in Section 3, if the distribution of outcomes, x t, is correlated with 
the agent’s actions, at, then learning can converge to different subjective so­
lutions, depending on how the agent conditions his forecasts. In a repeated 
game, correlations are likely to occur since agents respond to each other past 
actions. The question is whether, such correlations result in a distribution of 
play which is a -possibly, subjective- correlated equilibrium. In a subjective cor­
related equilibrium, agents’ subjective beliefs may contemplate correlated play 




























































































strategies (non unitary beliefs). That is, agents best replies can be subjective 
conditional best replies.
There are several reasons why correlated equilibrium, and not Nash equi­
librium, seems to emerge as the central reference equilibrium concept in learning 
theory. First, as it has been said, correlations naturally arise in repeated play. 
Second, as Aumann (1987) has argued, Bayesian rationality in a multiagent 
context (without common priors) is equivalent to a subjective correlated equi­
librium. Third, as Hart and Schmeidler (1989) have shown, in a correlated 
equilibrium every agent can be viewed as playing a zero sum game against the 
opponents. This has two related implications. The first is that the existence of 
correlated equilibria can be derived using standard separation arguments (i.e., 
without the recall to a fixed point argument); the second is that, as we will see. 
the simple zero sum game, such as that between a player and the environment, 
it has been known to be learnable. The question is whether players condition 
properly, to guarantee that the joint solution of this learning process results in 
a correlated equilibrium.
In the context of repeated games, Kalai and Lehrer (1995) and, indepen­
dently, Nyarko (1994) have shown that bayesian learning leads, eventually, to 
approximate subjective correlated equilibria when beliefs satisfy an absolute 
continuity condition. They also provide conditions that guarantee that such 
convergence is to an objective correlated equilibrium. That is, strong merging 
(or weak merging) of beliefs translate into objective (subjective) equilibrium 
outcomes. But, as we have seen, these consistency conditions require strong 
absolute continuity assumptions. The question is whether weaker consistency 
conditions result in some form of equilibrium outcome.
Recently, Foster and Vohra (1995), in the context of a two players re­
peated stage game (with myopic payoffs), have proved a remarkable result. 
They show that if both players behave as well calibrated forecasters, then the 
asymptotic distribution of forecasts, or calibrated beliefs is a correlated equilib­
rium, and that -for almost every game- any correlated equilibrium is learnable 
by well calibrated players. Unfortunately, their existence proof of well calibrated 
players, based in the zero-sum characterization of correlated equilibria, is not 
constructive.
As it has been seen in Example 1, if the actions of players are correlated, 
players may correctly perceive the marginal distribution, but this does not mean 
that the product of these marginals distributions is the joint distribution (a basic 




























































































famous Shapley example. That is. 
Exam ple 1’ (Shapley)
b1 b2 b3
a1 0,0 2.1 1,2
a2 1,2 0.0 2,1
a3 2,0 1,2 0,0
Fudenberg and Levine (1995a) show that the long run play of universally 
consistent behavioral rules are (infinitely often) correlated distributions that 
have a marginal best response property. That is. agents -subjectively- best 
reply to the empirical marginal distributions. For instance, in Example T. 
it is known that fictitious play cycles along the strategy vectors with positive 
payoffs and that these cycling patterns slow down. The asymptotic distributions 
have the marginal best reply property, but the joint distribution may not be a 
correlated equilibrium.
The convergence of learning processes to subjective non Nash, or corre­
lated, equilibria (or, just marginal best reply solutions) is directly related to the 
complexity of the game and the potential benefits that players may get from 
reaching “objective” beliefs. Three possible sources of subjectivism are: i) the 
lack of enough experimentation; ii) the existence of correlations that may occur 
through the game, and in) the “misspecification” of the model. While the exper­
imentation costs are easy to measure (for example, “enough experimentation” 
in an extensive form game means that all nodes are “tested infinitely often”; 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1994, 1995), Hendon et al. (1995)), it is less obvious 
how to measure the “complexity” of correlated patterns or of possible model 
misspecifications. Such “complexity” measures could help us to understand the 
gap between subjective and objective equilibrium outcomes.
4.2 The learnability o f N ash equilibria
As it has been seen, under relatively weak monotonicity assumptions, if the 
learning process converges, it will converge to a Nash equilibrium. Also, under 
the appropriate absolute continuity (and independence) assumptions bayesian 
learning converges to Nash equilibrium in repeated games (see also footnote 
5). Furthermore, it has been known for some time that, for some classes of 
games, convergence to Nash equilibria is guaranteed for certain classes of learn­




























































































play in (strict) dominance solvable games, convergence to Nash has been shown 
for fictitious play in zero-sum games (Robinson 1951 and Brown 1951) and in 
2 x 2  games (with a prespecified “breaking ties” rule; Miyasawa, 1961) . These 
results (as well as Foster and Vohra’ (1995) convergence to correlated equilib­
rium) are in terms of beliefs. It is well known that convergence of beliefs does 
not imply convergence of the empirical distributions of play (see, for example, 
Jordan 1993). As we have also seen, Fudenberg and Levine (1995a) show that 
if players’ behavioral rules satisfy their asymptotic universal consistency condi­
tion, then players can only be playing infinitely often strategies that satisfy the 
marginal best reply property.
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) provide a -sharper- global convergence result 
for fictitious play in 2 x 2 games (with a unique totally mixed Nash equilibrium) 
by considering an augmented game in which payoffs are perturbed. This work 
has been extended by Benai'm and Hirsch (1994) and, recently, Kaniowski and 
Young (1995) have shown that, in the same context of 2 x 2 games, if both 
agents learning rules are of fictitious play type -with perturbations- then the 
learning process converges almost surely to a stable Nash equilibrium, either 
mixed or pure (in fact, arbitrarily close to a dynamically stable equilibiurm). 
For example, in the Battle of the Sexes game the learning process converges to 
one of the two pure strategy equilibria with probability one. All these global 
convergence results for 2 x 2 games use stochastic approximation techniques and, 
as Kaniowski and Young point out, they can also be interpreted as the output of 
an evolutionary process with two populations where agents are fictitious players 
with random sampling (as in Young 1993). These results, however, do not 
generalize to more than two actions games since Shapley’s example (Example 
T) remains a counterexample to global convergence of play.
With respect to local stability results, it has also been known that strict 
Nash equilibria (that is, Nash equilibria with single valued best replies) are leam- 
able equilibria in the sense that are asymptotically locally stable to some process 
of adaptive learning -say, satisfying Milgrom and Roberts monotonicity condi­
tion (see, for example, Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993). As we have seen, Foster 
and Vohra (1995) also provide a local stability result for correlated equilibrium 
(i.e., any correlated equilibrium can be forecasted by calibrated forecasters. Fu­
denberg and Kreps (1993) provide a local stability result for Nash equilibrium. 
They consider “convergence of behavioral strategies” instead of the previously 
used “convergence of beliefs (or empirical frequencies).” More specifically, they 
consider a strategy profile, a ' locally stable if the following weak asymptotic 




























































































players converge to the empirical distribution of play; ii) if. for every player, 
the mixed strategy played at t. a’t(ht) (not necessarily all the pure strategies in 
its support) is within an et > 0 of being the best reply, where e, —♦ 0. and Hi) 
for every 6 > 0, there is a t such that Prob{/i,| linv_oc v[{K) =  CT'} > 1 — <5. 
They show that every Nash equilibrium is locally stable and that any non Nash 
equilibrium strategy profile is not locally stable (in particular, correlated equi­
librium that are not Nash equilibrium are not locally stable).
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) results can be viewed as a learning justi­
fication of Nash equilibria. Loosely speaking, in repeated play finite games, 
“every Nash equilibrium is learnable and the only learnable strategy profiles 
are Nash equilibria.” As I remarked, however, their asymptotic consistency 
condition -that is. their leamability concept- is very weak, and it must be 
since, for example, it prescribes that, Nash equilibria where agents play weakly 
dominated strategies, or the mixed Nash equilibrium in the Battle of the Sexes, 
are learnable. However, for most learning algorithms that have any chance to 
learn in relatively complicated environments such equilibria do not emerge as 
the outcome of the learning process. For example, as we have just seen, in 
2 x 2  games, Kaniowski and Young’ “perturbated learners” learn such -non dy­
namically stable-  equilibria with zero probability. Of course, the same remark 
applies to the local belief stability concept of Foster and Vohra (1995).
4.3 The “support” o f attraction
As we have seen, for a large class of learning algorithms, when play converges it 
must be to a Nash equilibrium and, when agents learn with experimentation (or 
other forms of perturbations), it must converge to a refinement of Nash equi­
librium. We have also seen some global convergence results for 2 x 2 games. A 
characterization for general strategic form games is available if only the “support 
of play” is considered. This is the approach taken by Marimon and McGrattan 
(1995) and by Hurkens (1994). The basic idea is that if a learning algorithm 
satisfies a monotonicity condition, then “learning processes move in the direc­
tion of the best reply map.” Furthermore, if agents experiment, individual best 
replies are perturbated. As a result, the support of the attractors of large classes 
of learning rules can be characterized.
Hurkens (1994) considers a learning model where players are members of 
classes and at each period of time a player of a class is randomly selected to 
play (as in Young 1993). These players have fixed finite memory and satisfy 




























































































the learning process has a Markovian structure. He then shows that, if memory 
is long enough, play eventually sets into a curb set. A curb set is one that it 
is closed under best replies and a curb* set is one that it is closed under un­
dominated best replies.8 Curb sets may include Nash equilibria with dominated 
strategies. However, Hurkens extends the same result to minimal curb* sets, by 
strengthening the monotonicity condition.
Marimon and McGrattan (1995) (see Section 3) consider variations of per­
sistent retracts. A persistent retract is minimal with respect to the property of 
being closed under perturbed best replies8. A robust equilibrium is a singleton 
persistent retract. For example, in a matching pennies game all the strategies 
define a persistent retract, but in the battle of the sexes, only the pure strategy 
Nash equilibria are robust equilibria (and curb* sets; but there are robust equi­
libria which are not curb’ sets). They also extend these concepts to correlated 
equilibria, to capture correlated cycles, such as the one of Shapley’s example. 
Long run dynamics of these learning algorithms either converge to a robust 
equilibrium or the support of the asymptotic play is a robust correlated cycle. In 
2 x 2  games, Posh (1995) shows how “perturbated learning” can result in well 
defined cycles. That is, a cycle (of the joint distribution of play) with support 
in a robust correlated cycle, as in the matching pennies game.
As we see, when agents use learning algorithms satisfying basic behavioral 
assumptions (monotonicity, inertia and experimentation) then play converges 
-if it does- to a refinement of Nash equilibria (robust equilibria). The problem 
arises when agents’ feedback translate into correlated cycling behavior. Such 
patterns may not result in well defined cycles and then it is not clear how agents 
condition their actions on the observed play. This problem does not arise in -say, 
supermodular- games where convergence is monotone. In such cases, pattern 
recognition of the asymptotic play does not disrupt the convergence process. 
Recently, Sonsino (1995) has extended adaptive behavior to allow for certain 
degree of pattern recognition. He shows how agents may learn and sustain a 
cycle, such as “take turns in playing pure strategy equilibria” in the Battle of the 
sexes, but he also shows that unbounded memory is needed to pattern recognize 
and converge to a mixed strategy profile.
8Formally, let PB, [a. , )  denote the set of non dominated pure strategies which are i ’s 
best replies to (T_t, and PB(cr) the corresponding joint best reply correspondence. A set 
D = Hz Di >s a CUTb set if PB(Y\j A(£>,)) C D. Such a set is called a minimal curb set if 
it does not properly contain a curb set. Curb* sets are similarly defined by considering only 
undominated best replies. Furthermore, D is a persistent retract if it is minimal with respect 




























































































4.4 N euralnets rediscover the Folk Theorem
There is one more lesson to learn from the recent literature on learning in 
games. In all the above discussion, learning agents did not have a final goal. 
The learning problem, however, can be greatly simplified if agents "know what 
they want.” For example, at any point in time, an agent can discriminate 
whether his “aspiration” level has been achieved or not. Cho (1994. 1995) 
develops a model in which two artificial intelligent agents (AIA). with neural 
network capabilities, play repeated games. He recovers the Folk Theorem. That 
is. any individually rational payoff can be achieved as the long-run payoff of 
the AIA game (with or without discount). He also extends this result (without 
discounting) to games with imperfect monitoring.
5 Learning dynam ic rational expectations equi­
libria
In competitive environments an individual agent does not affect the social out­
come and. therefore, he does not create strange correlations out of his optimal 
actions and mistakes. Furthermore, most learning models only address the prob­
lem of forecasting a public outcome, such as prices. These features simplify the 
learning problem. In competitive environments, however, we typically study 
intertemporal problems with continuous action sets. This feature complicates 
again the learning problem.
5.1 Learnable R ational E xpectations Equilibria
Most macroeconomic models are examples of the general competitive model 
with intertemporal feedback, where there is a continuum of agents -say, I =
[0,1]- and a public outcome evolves according to x t = at_i), x t-i, st)
(see Section 2). Furthermore, in many models, an = BRi(xet'+1). where x t+1 *s 
agent i ’s expectation of xt+\, at t. In this case, there is a well defined mapping 
T : A ^’1! —* Aqo, such that {x(} =  F ({x i,t} *€/) Rational expectations equilib­
ria are fixed points of T, in the sense that {x ’t } = T ({x*};<=/). That is, agents 
agree in the right forecast, even when this means agreeing on a non stationary 
paths. Most existing learning models make three important shortcuts. First, 
they assume a representative agent, second, the model is reduced to a “tem­




























































































(see, for example, Grandmont, 1994) and, third, the learnability question is 
limited to the fixed points of the temporary equilibrium map, x * =  'y(x’). that 
is to the stationary fixed points of T(-). In addition to a a fixed point there 
can be the stationary fixed cycles, which are stationary rational expectations 
equilibria (SREE).9 Of these “short cuts”, probably the most “distorting” one 
is the representative agent. It violates a basic learnability principle: agents may 
imitate others (social learning), but “agents learn independently.” In a REE 
different agents must share the same beliefs about public outcomes, but learning 
is supposed to study how such a coordination of beliefs takes place. The repre­
sentative agent introduces feedback effects (e.g., his mistakes are not smoothed 
out by others) that are not present in historical competitive economies.
Subjectiv ist and rational belief equilibria
As in games, self-fulfilling expectations may not imply rational expecta­
tions. In fact, as I mentioned in Section 3, some “subjectivist” concepts, such 
as Kurz’s “rational beliefs,” have been postulated as a -weaker than REE- so­
lution to dynamic competitive models. Nevertheless, some of the sources for 
“subjectivism,” discussed in Section 4, disappear in competitive environments. 
In particular, the agent should not be mislead about his effects on public out­
comes, which are nil, nor be concerned about individual correlations. This, 
however, does not mean that subjective competitive equilibria can not exist. For 
example, in Kurz’s (1994a and 1994b) rational belief equilibria, it is only re­
quired that all agents beliefs must be “compatible with the data.” That is, 
they must satisfy the absolute continuity property of only assigning zero proba­
bility to unobserved events. In his examples, non REE rational belief equilibria 
exist by having agents disagreeing with the objective REE distribution - v -  in 
its nonstationary component. In other words, agents agree in “pattern recogniz­
ing” stationary public events, but fail to grasp the complexity of the underlying 
-possibly, nonstationary- economy.
One way to get disagreement between REE and rational belief equilibria is 
by having some nonstationarity built into the environment -say, an important 
tail event. But then, it is not clear that there should be any loss of efficiency 
from not reaching REE. In fact, continuity of infinitely lived agents’ preferences 
implies that tail events should have no effect on prices, otherwise (without 
continuity) the same existence of REE is at stake. This suggests an interesting 
relationship between learnability of equilibria and market completeness.




























































































Araujo and Sandroni (1994) show, that, in an exchange economy with 
dynamically complete markets, bayesian learners always converge to rational 
expectations; a remarkable result. As it is standard in this literature, they ap­
peal to Blackwell-Dubins theorem (see, Section 3) and the facts that agents' 
preferences are continuous and all public information -that is, prices- is en­
dogenous. Nevertheless, it has been known, since, for example, the work of 
Townsend (1983) that in stationary economies -with incomplete markets- the 
learning process may result in generating non stationary prices, which presum­
ably could result in rational belief equilibria which are not REE.
There is another source of subjectivism, which has already been mentioned, 
of which we have a number of examples: model misspecification. An example, 
can be that all agents use a linear forecasting model when REE prices have non 
linearities and the economy converges to a “linear rational belief equilibrium." 
Most of these models, however, maintain a representative agent assumption or 
that agents share similar learning rules (models). Both assumptions impose a 
high degree of “coordinated subjectivism".
E -stability
The leamability of the SREE with fixed learning rules has been well stud­
ied. In particular, the following classes of learning rules have been studied: i)
finite memory forecasting rules x\+l = __ x*-m). where the class /(•)
satisfies certain basic assumptions, such as the ability to forecast stationary 
paths (i.e., x = f ( x , . . . , x )  (see, for example, Grandmont and Laroque, 1991 
and Grandmont 1994); ii) Cagan’s adaptive learning rules: x'+1 =  *t +a{xt-\  — 
Xf), with a constant gain a  £ (0, 1) (see, for example, Guesnerie and Woodford 
1991, and Evans and Honkapohja, 1993a, 1993b) and, in) learning rules with an 
stochastic approximation representation of the form xf+1 — x\ + at(xt-i — xf), 
such as recursive least square rules (the gain sequence satisfies the “decay 
condition," mentioned in Section 3.4, {a(}, a t £ (0, 1) a, = +oo and
Qf  < +oc, V > l )10 (see Bray 1983, Marcet and Sargent 1989a. 1989b,
10Evans and Honkapohja (1995a), call an E-stable equilibrium that is stable to over- 
parametrizations of the learning rule strongly E-stable, otherwise they call it weakly E-stable 
(Overaparmetrizations examples are: in a k cycle, consider k ■ n cycles; in an ARMA(fc, n) 
model, consider increasing (fc, n), etc.) In their examples where a “representative agent” learns 
an indeterminate equilibrium with an ARMA rule, such equilibrium is only weakly E-stable. 
In Duffy’s example the “representative agent” only reacts to current events and his behavior 
immediately feedback into the economy: his forecasting rule is irf+J = [1 +  (6 — l)7rt]/6 where 




























































































Woodford 1990, Evans and Honkapohja 1994, 1995a, 1995b. 1995c, among oth­
ers). Some of this work studies the the relation between the “determinacy" 
(local uniqueness) of the the SREE, or of the corresponding REE sunspot cy­
cle, and the leamability of the corresponding equilibrium using adaptive learning 
rules (see, for example, Guesnerie and Woodford 1991).
By using specific classes of forecasting rules the concept of leamable equi­
librium is well defined. The learnability of a SREE, x ’ =  7(2:*), is given by 
the interaction of the 7 map and the forecasting map (assuming a representa­
tive agent). That is, for finite memory rules (i) or for Cagan rules (11). one can 
use standard stability theory (i.e., characterizing the asymptotic stability by lin­
earization around the steady state, etc.), and for rules of the form (in), stochas­
tic approximation theory provides the necessary characterization. In particular, 
if the corresponding ODE (recall Section 3), jjf =  E  [7(a:(r)) — x ( t )] .  is locally 
asymptotically stable at x*, then the SREE is called E-stable. In models with 
constant gain, (ii), the asymptotic stability properties also depend on a  being 
small enough. That is, if agents place enough weight on current events (a close 
to one) the SREE may not be learnable, even if the ODE is locally asymptot­
ically stable and, therefore, leamable with rules with decreasing gain. These 
conditions generalize to “determinate” SREE cycles.
Woodford (1990) was the first to show that sunspot cycles could be leam­
able equilibria. In a sense, this result created skepticism on the idea that learning 
can help to “select” among REE. In fact, there are examples where adaptive 
learning agents’ beliefs converge to indeterminate REE (Evans and Honkapohja, 
1994, Duffy, 1994). Does this mean that any REE is leamable?
As we have seen in relation to Fudenberg and Kreps (1993)’ results (any 
Nash equilibrium is leamable), the answer to the above question depends on the 
definition that we use of learnability. For instance, a closer look at the “conver­
gence to indeterminate equilibria” examples reveals that a very weak concept 
of learnability is being used: they are either not robust to overparametrizations 
of the learning rule or require -usually, a representative- “overreactive” agent 
with important feedback effects 34. Similarly, a closer look at the “convergence 
to cycles” models shows, that learnability of -say, a k-  cycle requires that agents 
follow rules of the form xet+k =  x\ 4- at(xt — xf). In other words, the cycle must 
have been “pattern recognized” before it can be learned. For example, Evans, 
Honkapohja and Sargent (1993) study a model of REE sunspots /c-cycles pop­
ulated by a fraction of perfect foresight agents and a fraction of agents that do 
not recognize cycles (e.g., they treat price fluctuations like noise). They show 




























































































of period k > 2 disappear. In other words, cycles may exist only if enough 
agents are simultaneously “tuned" to them.
Ultimately, however, leamability is an empirical matter. The experimental 
evidence shows well defined regularities. In particular, non stationary REE 
and non-stable SREE have never been observed (see. for example. Marimon 
and Sunder 1995). Similarly, with respect to sunspot cycles, the experimental 
evidence is revealing: purely belief driven cycles have never been observed, 
however, when agents share a common experience with a real cycle, perfectly 
correlated with a sunspot cycle, the E-stable sunspot cycle may persist after 
the real shock, driving the real cycle, disappears (Marimon, Spear and Sunder. 
1993).
5.2 Global stability and local instability?
The macro experimental evidence is consistent with the theoretical (and exper­
imental) results in games. When learning is not “tuned to an equilibrium" but 
agents must experiment and coordinate based on past experience, then many 
REE dynamics may de disregarded. In particular, dynamic stability criteria for 
large classes of learning rules, provide a good global characterization of observed 
paths (e.g., inflation paths tend to cluster around a E-stable SREE; as in the 
Battle of the Sexes agents converge to play pure strategy equilibria). Neverthe­
less, experimental evidence also shows that local dynamics, around a E-stable 
SREE, may be fairly complicated and not well predicted by the local stability 
properties of simple learning algorithms. This phenomena is particularly true 
when there are fluctuations around the steady state (e.g.. there are complex 
roots). Subjects tend to react to such fluctuations (see, Marimon and Sunder 
1995), as in games players tend to react to cycling patterns. As a result, the 
local convergence properties depend on how agents “pattern recognize” such 
high frequency fluctuations and how their behavior “feedback” into the econ­
omy. This dichotomy between the predictability of low frequency data and the 
difficulty to predict high frequency data is, in turn, consistent with macroeco­
nomic and financial data and, therefore, learning models can not only help to 
explain it, but also help to design economic policies.
Stabilization policies w ith learning
Agents expectations always play an important role in the successful im­




























































































policies. Unfortunately, most macroeconomic models have either made an ad- 
hoc treatment of expectations precluding agents from anticipating the effects of 
policies or, as a healthy reaction to such models, assumed rational expectations 
precluding agents from learning the possible consequences of policies. Recently 
learning models have started to fill this gap.
Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (1995) show how introducing a (cred­
ible) bound on the amount of deficit to GDP ratio that can be financed by 
seignorage can be a powerful instrument for stabilization policy, resulting in 
global stability, in an Overlapping Generations model with learning by hetero­
geneous agents. Such a policy, however, only makes more acute the problem of 
indeterminacy of REE equilibria. In other words, a policy which is often pro­
posed (for example, in the Maastricht Treaty) is an advisable policy only when 
learning is taken into account. They also provide experimental data showing 
how subjects learn better, than simple adaptive learning algorithms, to foresee 
the effects of policies, but in their model this results in making the stabilization 
polices even more effective.
Similarly, Marcet and Nicolini (1995) show that recurrent inflationary 
episodes interrupted by pegging exchange rates policies, such as the ones ex­
perienced in several South American countries in the last twenty years, can be 
explained by an adaptive learning model, where agents endogenously change the 
weight place in current events (the “tracking” parameter a  discussed in Section 
3). Again, incorporating learning not only allows to explain some macro data, 
but also provides a different evaluation of an often proposed stabilization policy.
Volatility, persistent correlations and com plicated dynam ics around  
the steady state
Learning models are increasingly used to explain patterns which do not 
seem to satisfy REE restrictions. From long run development trends (Arifovic 
et al. 1995) to short term trade and price volatility in financial and exchange 
markets (see, for example, Hussman, 1992, Brock and LeBaron, 1995, de Font- 
nouvelle, 1995). Some of these “high frequency” models exploit the fact that 
around the steady state variability may be high, and correlations persistent, 
in an adaptive learning model. In fact, it is well understood that the speed 
of convergence near equilibrium depends on the sophistication of learning rules 
(again, the tradeoff between tracking and accuracy discussed in Section 3).
A claim, often made, is that final convergence to a competitive equilib­




























































































soften.” This claim goes back to the problem studied by Grossman and Stiglitz. 
among others, of who has an incentive to purchase information if equilibrium 
prices are fully revealing. Brock and Hommes (1995) have, recently, devel­
oped an interesting model that addresses this issue. A simple example of their 
economies goes as follows. Agents can either forecast using their, relatively 
myopic, forecasting rules or purchase the services of a more sophisticated fore­
caster. All forecasting rules are of the stochastic approximation type, however 
the corresponding ODE is unstable if agents use their "free” rules, while it is sta­
ble if they use the -more accurate- costly rule. Far from the steady state most 
agents buy the forecasting services, pushing the economy towards the steady 
state, however, near the steady state it is not worth it to pay for forecasting 
services. This implies local instability (as in Grandmont and Laroque 1991) 
and, at the same time, non divergence from a neighborhood of the steady state. 
As a result adaptive paths may be fairly complicated; they prove the existence 
of hom oclinic orbits and of strange chaotic attractors  for a class of predictor 
rules.
In the experimental lab, we have observed similar "complicated dynamics" 
around the steady state. There are, however, two distinct underlying phenom­
ena. One is that, as in Brock and Hommes. agents' loose the incentives to 
sharpen their decisions rules as to finally converge to equilibrium, and learn­
ing paths only “cluster around” the E-stable SREE (see Marimon and Sunder. 
1993). The other is that around the SREE there may be fluctuations and even 
agents that can appropriately guess the SREE (e.g.. is the announced policy) 
try to follow the fluctuations in order to capture possible short-run rents (Ma­
rimon and Sunder, 1995). In other words, a trader in the stock market may not 
be interested in “fundamentals.”
5.3 Social planners as AIA
As in games, there are macroeconomic problems where it seems appropriate 
to think that the learner has the “right pattern and equilibrium in mind.” 
These are planner's problems, in which the planner (or principal) is concerned 
that the agent follows a contract as planned. The resulting optimal strategies 
in these type of problems are fairly complicated history dependent contracts. 
Nevertheless, building on the work of Cho on neural nets  playing repeated 
games (Section 4), Cho and Sargent (1995), show how relatively sophisticated 
planner’s problems (e.g., an optimal capital accumulation problem with private 





























































































6 C oncluding remark
As I mentioned in the Introduction, to build a theory of the leamable in eco­
nomics goes way beyond some standard justifications for the study of learning in 
economics. According to this view, I have placed the emphasis in this abridged 
survey in several lines of inquiry: i) the characterization of adaptive learn­
ing, of broad classes of rules, based on behavioral assumptions and resulting 
in learning process which are “well behaved” (i.e., satisfy certain consistency 
condition) in well understood environments; it) parallel to the definition of alter­
native consistency conditions, the definition of subjective forms of equilibria: in) 
the characterization of the asymptotic properties of certain classes of learning 
algorithms and their ability to select among equilibria: w) the ability of learning 
models to explain observed data which is not properly accounted for by existing 
equilibrium theories, and v) the use of learning models as normative models to 
help the design of economic policy and of political and economic institutions.
Although -possibly, for sociological reasons- research in learning in games 
and in learning in macro have been conducted fairly separately, as sometimes 
has been the case between learning theory and experimental evidence, I have 
tried to bring these different lines together, showing how progress in all the 
above lines of inquiry “crosses field lines.” In summary, I hope this paper will 
help others, as it has helped me, to go to the original sources and learn from 
learning in economics.
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